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Book Reviews

J. Bander. With A Preface by the
Author and an Introduction by Roscoe Pound. 1963. Michie Company, Charlottesville, Virgina. 231 pages. $4.95.
MR. DOOLEY ON CHOICE OF LAW by Edward

In the year 1893, 26 years old and a veteran newspaper reporter of eight years,
Finley Peter Dunne was enjoying a drink in the saloon of James McGarry in Dearborn Street near the office of the Chicago Tribune. Jay Gould had died that day and
McGarry made some amusing remarks that Dunne, using McGarry's brogue, converted into an article for the Sunday Chicago Post, attributing them to "Col. McNerry."
At the time Dunne was on the Chicago Evening Post. He and his editor, Cornelius
McAuliff, were fighting the Chicago City Council. Thinking it might be dangerous
to call an alderman a crook, Dunne hit upon the idea of having a comic Irishman in
dialect do so. Dunne revived "Col. McNerry" to bludgeon the bribe-taking members
of the Council. It was an instant success; the victims, feigning amusement, dared not
complain.
All but James McGarry. He complained to John R. Walsh, the banker who owned
the "Evening Post." At Walsh's request, Dunne had "Col. McNerry" returned to
Ireland and invented Martin Dooley, placing his saloon on Archer Avenue, one of
Chicago's four old plank roads, called by the Irish "Archey Road." To the regret of
"Mr. McKenna," McNerry's listener, Dunne substituted "Mr. Hennessey"-"Hinnissy" as Mr. Dooley always pronounced it.
Dunne achieved international fame and left Chicago for New York and London,
when Dooley gave "Hinnissy" a book review of "Tiddy Rosenfelt's" history of the
"Rough Riders." When "Hinnissy" remarks that if "Tiddy" wants to blow his horn
"lave him do it," Mr. Dooley agrees, but in his punch line says that if he were
"Tiddy," he'd call the book "Alone In Cubia."
You would think that when he read this, Teddy Roosevelt would have become
Dunne's mortal enemy, but this was not so. "Tiddy" regretted to say that his family
and initimate friends were delighted with the piece and insisted on meeting him.
Dunne became his best friend and was wined and dined at the White House.
As Franklin P. Adams (F.P.A.) has said, Dunne was "an artist" and a perfectionist
who was never satisfied with his product. Compelled to write in dialect, he spent
hours on a few words, particularly the punch line endings. This is why his imitators
have failed so miserably. F.P.A. is right when he tells us that "few popular writers
ever wrote more maliciously." This was because Dunne, an Irish rebel, resented in-
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justice, and detested sham and hypocrisy, with the selfish stupidity that invariably
accompanies them.
As a baseball reporter, Dunne watched "Billy" Sunday on the Chicago White
Stockings and gave the name "Southpaw" to a left-handed pitcher, because his left
arm faced South Chicago. As a police reporter covering Chicago's courts and politics,
he also saw a great deal of lawyers. It was natural then that Mr. Dooley should discuss lawyers across his bar with "Hinnessy." But not until Edward J. Bander wrote
this anthology, was there one book in which Mr. Dooley's best articles on lawyers
were collected. What John Stuart Mill does for Jeremy Bentham and the D'Oyly
Carte Opera Company for Gilbert and Sullivan, Edward J. Bander does here for
Dunne. Elmer Ellis' "Mr. Dooley At His Best" (Scribner's, 1938 and now out of
print), Ellis' life, "Mr. Dooley's America" (Knopf, 1941), and Philip Dunne's recent
"Mr. Dooley Remembers" (Little, Brown, 1968) are great (See my review 13
CATHOLIC U. L. Rev. 86) but from different points of view.
This book about Mr. Dooley is by a lawyer for lawyers, every one of whom should
own it. It is remarkable in that as a young Jewish boy in Boston, Ed Bander came to
know the Irish the hard way, by wearing an orange tie and green "yamakey" on St.
Patrick's Day. After riding the Destroyer Escort from the Gilberts to Sagami Wan,
Tokyo, Bander returned from the wars to marry a "Shix-as" of a prominent Concord family who knew Henry Thoreau "as a local loafer." They have three children;
two play the accordion; one, the piano. After Boston U. Law School, Cuyahoga
Juvenile Court, Harvard Law Library, and the United States Court of Appeals, First
Circuit, Ed Bander is now Assistant Law Librarian at New York University Law
School.
Without spoiling the fun for you let me give you a few samples from his grand
book.
In an excruciatingly comical piece, Mr. Dooley tells why he'll never be a witness for
a friend again. In a weak moment he agreed to testify to "Lake Michigan droppin'
through Harrigan's ceiling." On cross, Dooley was held in contempt, called a thief
and accused of kidnapping little Charlie Ross.
How often do you friends who become witnesses complain in the same way to you
today?
Mr. Dooley pays his disrespects to the Fifth Amendment with this one:
Lootgert, "a large German man," was tried for "puttin' his wife into a
breakfas' dish." A crackpot "Perfesser" confused the "pure-minded pathrithes"
on the jury but "no wan" was so "crool" as to ask "what anny wan means," least
of all whether Lootgert did it.
and his prescient disrespects to the Durham case with this:
When "Haughty son iv wealthy fam'ly steals watch from awful Hogan," an
expert testifies that "when he hooked the watch," he was suffering from
"tomaine excelsis," "warts," "bozimbal," and "hoptocoliographophilloplutomania or what the Germans call tantrums." Before and after he was a "magnificent specimen." The witness cannot imagine how he stayed "featherheaded"
long enough to swipe a watch.
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Another yarn I love is this one which is better even than the one Arthur Train's
Mr. Tutt tells:
When Schmidt sued Dooley's friend, Darcy, for libel, Dooley landed on the
jury. The first ballot was six to five for "Darsay." Dooley got them down to
"ileven to one" but "a little man with whiskers," "shtd out brave f'r Schmidt."
Dooley was sure h'd hold out because he was "wanst a night watchman and
could sleep on th' top iv a pole." Remembering he loved cards, Dooley played
him "wan game iv siven up." "Th' foreman made out a verdick." "In th'
inthrests of law an' justice an' not to skin th' little man but to up-hold th' constitution," Dooley "turned the jack."
As for Judges, when the "lively lawyer that's wurruked twinty hours a day" becomes a Judge, Mr. Dooley tells us he can't "think out iv a hammock." And that
Judges would "step livelier if they were paid be th' piece." Charlie Desmond is
saying the same thing in New York today.
Teddy Roosevelt invited Booker T. Washington to dinner at the White House.
Dooley explains the political consequences to "Hinnissy:"
Thousands iv men who wudden't have voted for him undher anny circumstances has declared that under no circumstances wud they now vote f'r him.
Describing the visit Dooley said Booker was not the first Washington to "et"
there; none of "th' Prisidents before Lincoln" fell out of their frames; Booker "used
proper discrimination between th' knife an' th' fork;" and that, an "invintory iv the
spoons showed" "that he had used gintlemanly resthraint." It made Dooley jealous.
He would like to go even if he "had to black up."
This I trust is enough to whet your appetite and convince you that this book is
a gold mine of "Dooleyana."
There is bound to be a new edition. In it, I would eliminate the three "Imitations"
and substitute "Mr. Dooley Discovers A Unanimous Dissent" by James Marsh of
the Philadelphia Bar (44 A.B.A.J. 585). This is the only imitation that is any good.
The glossary is great, with two exceptions. It is disorganized in the index and very
incomplete. "Words and Phrases" deserves expansion.
These are minor faults. The book in every line shows the ten years Edward J.
Bander has devoted to it. We get what he paid for.
Dunne's Centennial comes in 1967. Bander now has over 500 Dooley pieces. He
seeks a Foundation grant to index them all on microfilm and place them in one
library. To date, he has been unsuccessful. We hope one comes to his aid so that
future generations may enjoy "Mr. Dooley" as we have. Dooley is for the ages.
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFE*

*Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
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THE AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON: REVOLUTIONARY AND EARLY NATIONAL
ORIGINS. By Bradley Chapin. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.
pp. viii, 164, Index. $6.00
In this slender, but carefully-researched volume, Professor Chapin has sought, by
clarifying the practical operation of the law of treason during the Revolutionary and
early National period, to illuminate the process whereby an English concept became
an integral part of the American Constitutional structure.1 By focusing on the political ferment of the period, and its impact on "The Law in Action," he has made a
valuable contribution to a better understanding of the origins and growth of an
important instrument which safeguards the American Democratic system.
In 1944, Professor Willard Hurst reported that ". . . records of trials for treason
are scant and do not contribue as much as the statutory material to outlining the
attitudes taken towards the crime."' His analysis of the records available to him led
to the conclusion that ". . . there were some significant signs of the growth of an
opinion that 'treason' must be more carefully defined and limited. Taken in the
context of the period as a whole, however, this note of skepticism was still subordinate to a broad and impulsive use of 'treason' as the means by which to ward off
what were viewed as extreme dangers to the security of the states."'
As a consequence of Professor Chapin's researches, however, the question may be
raised whether this conclusion has not been too broadly stated. In the Bibliography,
75 cases heard between 1777 and 1782 are cited. From them a new picture, less harsh
than that drawn by the statutory provisions, emerges. The most significant feature
to emerge from a consideration of these cases is the manner in which trials for
treason were conducted during this period. A remarkable example of this attitude
is the response of the revolutionary army officers who were requested by the State
of New York to hear treason charges by courts martial: "State prisoners should and
ought to be tryed (sic) by a court of this State where they should have all the
priviledges (sic) of the Law ... "'Private citizens were equally reluctant to accept
the required commissions of Oyer and Terminer. The only alternative, therefore,
was to issue the commissions, which were required by statute, to the regular justices,
and to bring prosecutions before them.
Once brought before the regularly-constituted courts, trials were conducted with
scrupulous regard for the proprieties, as is the current practice. Counsel were
appointed, and the rules of criminal procedure applied, the rigours of the evidentiary provisions had to be complied with, and the specific onus resting upon the
prosecution in treason cases had to be met before the courts would convict. After
conviction, pardons were generously granted, and, taken in all, the records reveal
a respect for the requirements of due process and individual liberty which was truly
remarkable. It must be borne in mind that throughout most of this period the suc-

3, §3.
Treason In The United States, 58 HARV. L. REv. 266, 246 (1944).
Id. at 272.

1 U.S. CONsT., ART.
2 Hurst,

'CHAPIN,

p. 64.
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cess of the Revolution hung in the balance.' The danger to the country was much
more immediate than the threats to the national welfare of the mid-Twentieth
Century. As Professor Chapin aptly observes:
From the viewpoint of the advocate of an extreme policy, the procedure here
described exhibits a law of diminishing returns. The policy in regard to traitors
became more cautious as the process approached execution .... Drastic purges
and violent assizes were not a part of the Revolution. There was no reign of
terror. The record is one of substantial justice done.'
The only flaw in the conduct of the Revolutionary Governments was their liberal
use of Bills of Attainder, Confiscatory Statutes and other means of forfeiture to
sequestrate the property of persons guilty of treasonable practices. Professor Chapin
attempts to explain this practice as due to ".

.

. the depth of feeling against the old

official class." However, he leaves the question of their "justice" open, as being unanswerable.
The other problem about which this book provides valuable information is an explanation of the cautious attitude adopted toward the definition of treason at the
Constitutional Convention.
In a letter written in 1792, Thomas Jefferson, at the time Secretary of State, set
out his views on political prosecutions:
Treason... when real, merits the highest punishment. But most codes extend
their definitions of treason to acts not really against one's country. They do not
distinguish between acts against the government, and acts against the-oppressions of the government; the latter are virtues; yet they have furnished more
victims to the executioner than the former; real treasons are rare; oppressions
frequent. The unsuccessful strugglers against tyranny, have been the chief
martyrs of treason laws in all countries.'
That this attitude reflects the policy of the drafters of the Constitution, in their
formulation of the "Treason" clause, which was one of ".

.

. preventing use of the

criminal law as an instrument of competition for political power" has been convincingly argued.' In this book Professor Chapin illustrates the Colonial and Revolutionary abuses brought about by a broad definition of treason. This tempered the
attitudes of the drafters of the Constitution.
By 1767, British policy towards their recalcitrant colonists had become clearthey sought to break the back of resistance by regarding it as conduct of a criminal
nature, and prosecuting the ringleaders for Treason. To this end they sought to
employ the Statute of 35 Henry VIII, in order to bring the most articulate complainants to England to stand their trial. Accordingly, the provincial Governors were
ordered to gather evidence for trials to be held in London.
This policy was regarded by the Colonists with distaste, and was one of the
5
Itwas only in 1781, with Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown, that it can be said that the
Colonists had clearly gained the ascendant. See NEVINS AND COMMAGER, HISTORY OF THE

UNITED STATES, 99-100 (1960).

a CHAPIN, pp. 70-71.
7THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 211,

0Hurst, supra note 2, at 444.

215 (Library ed. 1903).
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grievances contained in the Declaration of Independence-"For transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offences." This experience was a significant factor in shaping the attitude of the Constitutional Convention towards developing the
concept of treason in relation to political expression.
Following the outbreak of hostilities, the Revolutionary states found themselves
confronted with wavering allegiance on the part of their residents. For internal
protection, a series of statutes were passed, on the recommendation of the Continental Congress. As Professor Chapin observes:
"This first public act to declare George III the enemy explicitly defied the sovereign and was a de facto declaration of independence."' These statutes drew heavily
on the English precedents, both statutory and case law. Thus the exigencies of war
produced the ironic position of persons claiming allegiance to the Crown being
prosecuted according to statutory terms drawing their meaning from terms of
allegiance to that same Crown.
Turning to the period following the Revolution, Professor Chapin does not attempt to grapple with the many technical problems which arise from the Constitution,"0 but instead confines himself to a narrative description of the Pennsylvania
Whiskey and Tax insurrections and the trial of Aaron Burr,1' in relation to the
climate of opinion prevalent, the passions it aroused, and the impact of Marshall's
opinion on his contemporaries. In doing so, he raises questions pertinent to our time.
In the light of Marshall's dictum in the Bollman case, that ". . . there must be an
actual assemblage of men to constitute a levying of war,"' the decision of the Court
in Dennis v. U.S." would appear to raise more questions than it settles. Marshall's
opinion arrested the tendency of expanding the doctrine of constructive treason,
which became law in the cases following the Pennsylvania rebellions.
In Dennis, the defendants had been charged with 'advocating the overthrow of
the Government,' under the Smith Act.' The Court chose to treat this as an
attempt:' "We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of
preparation for revolution." They went further, and treated the defendants' conduct as a conspiracy. If, as the Court held," there was a 'clear and present danger'
of subversion, it may be argued that this was 'levying war' against the United
States.'
If the "Treason clause" is considered in the historical context presented by Professor Chapin, a pattern is seen to emerge-the clause would then be read as having
an extensive application, to cover all cases of internal political protest, and to restrict
the classes of punishable conduct. To put the problem differently: does the clause
define a specific crime, of an extremely serious nature, or does it extend to a sphere
0CHAPIN, p. 37.

10See Hurst, supra note 2, at p. 395 et seq.
1'United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 2, 55, 1, Nos. 14, 692a, 14, 693 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (1807).
"Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, (1950).
14 For the terms of the Indictment see 71 S.Ct. at 860.
Id. at 863.
"Id. at 866-869.
1I

'"U.S. v. Burr, supra note 11. See Cramer v. U.S., 325 U.S. 1, 25, 38 (1944).
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of activity vital to the survival of the American democratic process?'
If the former interpretation is adopted, a multiplicity of lesser offences, such as the
one forming the basis of the charge in Dennis, may be enacted. The result of this
would be to render the provision of the Constitution ineffective. On the other hand,
the broader test does not answer the question: what conduct constitutes "Treason"?
It cannot be determined by the nature of the punishment imposed: this is left to
the discretion of Congress.
If the provisions of Art 3, Section 3 are read together with the first amendment, it
appears at least arguable that they reflect a policy of removing fetters on freedom of
Speech and Press, to allow the free expression and interchange of political beliefs.
The only limitation on this freedom would appear to be the duty not to actively
obstruct or hinder the enforcement of the Government's policy by an "overt act."
This has been held to be "constructively levying war."" If Dennis had so behaved,
then he should have been tried for treason, and afforded the right provided him by
the Constitution. If his behavior fell short of this offence, then he nevertheless was
exposed to charges of Breach of the Peace, Nuisance, or even Assault,' but his behavior limited to the expression of views short of overt conduct would appear to be
protected by the First Amendment.
In Cramer v. U.S.' Mr. Justice Jackson described one of the policies underlying
Art. 3, Section 3 as guarding against "... perversion by establishing authority to repress peaceful political opposition. '
The question turns on the word "peaceful." If the Court meant by this that the
views being expounded had to be non-violent before they were constitutionally
protected, then one wonders how groups advocating war with Russia, Cuba et. al.
would fare? The court would be obliged to determine each time on how "peaceful"
the aims of the litigants before it are. On the other hand, if by "peaceful" is meant
the manner of expression of the views, an effective criterion has been establishedthis would be protected under the "overt act" requirement of Treason. In this manner, were the Communist Party to indulge in violence and civil disobedience, the
"constructive war" doctrine would adequately cover the situation.
In the light of the historical limitations on the constitutional definition of treason
as outlined in Professor Chapin's book, reexamination of the Dennis case is necessary.' The Supreme Court cannot avoid the constitutional implications of prosecutions like that in Dennis by avoiding the issues.
MICHAEL KATZ*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi Law School.
See HURsT, op. cit., supra note 4.

19Burr's case, supra note 17.
CRIMINAL LAw ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER, pp. 636, 746, (1948).
-325 U.S. 1(1944).
2Id. at 27.
21Other cases raising this question are U. S. v. Foster (D. C. N. Y. 1949), 9 F.R.D. 364;
Yates v. U.S., 356 U.S. 298 (1957); Scales v. U.S., 260 F. 2nd 21 (1958); Aff'd 367 U.S. 203;
Rehearing den'd: 566 U.S. 978.
20 DESSION,

